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Abstract 
Previous studies into aid allocation have concluded that foreign aid is allocated not only 
according to development needs but also according to donor self-interest. We revisit this 
topic and allow for donor as well as recipient specific effects in our analysis. Our results 
indicate that roughly half of the predicted value of aid is determined by donor specific 
effects. Of the remaining variation, recipient need accounts for 36 percent and donor self-
interest for about 16 percent. This suggests that the previous literature has overstated the 
importance of donor self-interest. However, bilateral donors seem to place little 
importance on recipient merit. Recipient merit, measured by growth, democracy and 







   3 
 
1.Introduction 
Do donors allocate aid according to development needs or according to their own 
interests? Donors state very different aims in their allocation of aid. Take for example the 
German and American development assistance goals. The reduction of poverty, protection 
of the environment, peace building, realizing democracy and promoting equitable forms of 
globalization are the guiding principles of Germany development assistance
1. This mission 
statement suggests that German aid is solely provided according to the recipients’ need and 
not according to German self-interest. This can be contrasted to the American aims: “U.S. 
foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign 
policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the 
citizens of the developing world.”
2 This mission statement suggests that self-interest is 
important in American development assistance. However, despite the difference in 
principles it may be that the actual aid allocation does not reflect these different principles. 
It may, for example, be the case that German aid is also allocated with self-interest in 
mind.  
The determinants of foreign aid allocation have received much attention in the 
development literature from the 1970s to the present. The majority of work in this area has 
claimed that donor self-interest plays a large role in determining how much aid a country 
receives, potentially undermining the efficiency of development aid. Research on aid 
effectiveness suggests that the marginal effectiveness of aid is highest when there is a good 
policy environment or where there is greatest need (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and 
Dollar 2002; Wood 2007). However, the importance of geo-political ties has been found 
by many, most notably Alesina and Dollar (2000), to substantially outweigh 
developmental motives.  
The aim of our paper is twofold. First, we revisit the questions whether recipient need, 
merit and donor self-interest motivate the allocation of aid. Second, we move beyond 
existing studies and evaluate the relative importance of recipient need, merit and donor 
self-interest. Our analysis is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents some 
empirical background and a brief overview of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes 
                                                            
1 http://www.bmz.de (July 2008) 
2 http://www.usaid.gov (July 2008) 
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the dataset and discusses the choice of estimation methods employed. The penultimate 
Section presents the regression results and provides an analysis of the relative importance 
of the determinants of foreign aid allocation. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background 
Patterns of Aid 
Despite a recent increase of aid from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), China and India, about 95 percent of bilateral aid is provided by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)
3. As Figure 1 shows, over three-quarters of this DAC bilateral aid 
over the period 1980-2004 ($840bn in constant 2003 dollars) was provided by five donors: 
the USA, Japan, France, Germany and the UK. The remaining 23 percent was given by the 
other 17 DAC member countries. Throughout this paper, we focus our attention on the top 
five donors and we aim to investigate their aid allocation. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
Like many previous studies our research is motivated by the question whether aid is 
provided with the main aim of development or whether other motives are important drivers 
in the allocation of aid. Looking at the list of top aid recipients in Table 1 (separated into 
the periods pre-Cold War, post-Cold War and post-September 11
th 2001) raises the 
suspicion that development may not be the main aim in the allocation of aid. Egypt and 
Israel, which had global rankings of 98
th and 23
rd out of 208 in terms of GDP per capita in 
1980, received large volumes of foreign aid during all periods. In particular, this is 
accounted for by the USA who has been a major supporter of both countries; over 40 
percent of USA bilateral aid goes to these two countries alone. Similarly, much of 
Japanese aid has tended to flow to Asian countries in the neighbourhood such as Vietnam 
and Indonesia. France and the UK provide a lot of foreign aid to their ex-colonies (Table 
2). In recent years, Iraq and Afghanistan have entered the top ten recipients following 
military interventions in these countries.
4 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
                                                            
3 OECD (2007) 
4 For a more detailed historical account see Thorbecke (2006) and Akram (2003). 5 
 
---Table 2 about here --- 
Based on these preliminary observations we ask the question of what determines aid 
allocation and a number of related issues: how do geo-political motives compare to 
developmental motives? Has the relative importance of these motives have changed over 
the period of analysis? Do the top five donors significantly differ from each other and from 
the rest of the donors in how they allocate foreign aid? 
Literature 
There is a large literature on the motivation behind foreign aid. McGillivray and White 
(1995) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature prior to 1990, while Berthelemy 
(2006b) and Dollar and Levin (2006) provide surveys of more recent studies.  
In the early literature (in particular see McKinlay and Little 1978a, 1978b 1979; Maizels 
and Nissanke 1984; Mosley 1981), allocation was estimated via two separate equations, 
one estimating the developmental concerns of the donor and the other estimating strategic 
interests. Later studies use a combined model which includes recipient characteristics as 
well as donor interest variables. Virtually without exception, the research so far has found 
that the political and economic interests of donors outweigh the developmental needs or 
merits of the recipients. Perhaps the best known of these aid allocation studies is Alesina 
and Dollar (2000), who suggest that bilateral donors care more about strategic and 
historical factors than the developmental needs of aid recipients. They focused on the 
tendency of major donors to give considerably more aid to ex-colonies than the efficient 
allocation of aid would warrant. Furthermore, they demonstrated a strong link between UN 
voting patterns and aid commitments (once other factors had been controlled for). 
However, their estimation relied on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and thus was 
potentially biased due to the presence of time-invariant unobservables correlated with 
explanatory variables – a common feature of cross-country panel data. More recently, 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthelemy (2006a, 2006b) have sought to address 
some of the econometric problems in the estimation of aid allocation models. In their work 
they allows for both sample selection and time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. 
Although using more sophisticated methods, Berthelemy and Tichit’s results broadly 
support the previous findings of Alesina and Dollar: donor self-interest is an important 
determinant in the allocation of development aid.  6 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Aid Data 
Our dataset covers the years 1980 to 2004 and is made up of data on the 22 Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and 186 recipient countries. Thus, our data consists 
of directed dyads that identify a recipient-donor pair for each year. 
The data on aid comes from the OECD online statistics database which provides data on 
DAC donor aid flows.
5 Aid is defined as grants or loans to recipient countries which are 
undertaken by the official sector for the promotion of economic development and welfare. 
This definition of aid includes emergency and distress relief. Aid must be provided on 
concessional terms, with loans having a minimum grant element of 25 percent. Aid 
includes technical assistance but excludes grants, loans and credit for military purposes or 
transfers to individuals. As is convention in the aid allocation literature, we use aid 
commitments rather than disbursements which provide a more accurate picture of intended 
aid allocation by donors in a given year (whereas there are many reasons that may prevent 
the aid from actually being disbursed.) Aid is reported in constant 2003 dollars, thus 
accounting for inflation over the period.   
This dataset is to our knowledge the largest of its kind, providing 92,400 potential 
observations (186 recipients · 22 donors · 25 years), although it only contains 45,289 
strictly positive ones given that not all donors give aid to all recipients in all years.  
Estimation Method 
The most common estimation method in the aid allocation literature is to estimate separate 
equation per donor. For example Alesina and Dollar (2000) analyse each donor’s 
behaviour in the following way: 
Donor 1:                                   ( 1 )     
Donor 2:                                     ( 2 )  
                                                            
5 We include both Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Part I countries and Official Aid (OA) to Part 
II countries as defined by the OECD. Many studies chose to exclude the Part II countries, which consist of 
more advanced developing countries and Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, because of 
the incompleteness of information prior to 1995. However, given the potential substitutability of aid between 
these two groups, we have incorporated them both in our analysis. Furthermore, over 25 countries (such as 
Bermuda, Kuwait and Netherland Antilles) have moved from Part I to Part II over the sample period. In 
2005, the OECD abolished the definition of Part II countries and has reverted to a single list of recipient 
countries. 7 
 
Donor 3:                                        (3) 
Where subscript j denotes the recipient and t time.       represents a vector of explanatory 
variables,    a constant and      the error term. The   coefficients are then compared to 
draw conclusions about individual donor behaviour. The most commonly used estimation 
method is OLS. One problem with this approach is that donors do not allocate aid to each 
recipient and thus equations (1)-(3) are estimated using different samples. The coefficients 
are therefore not directly comparable. Cross-country regressions tend to be sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of countries, thus estimation over different samples may potentially 
provide misleading results.
6 
One way of addressing the issue of comparability is to estimate the set of equations on the 
same sample. Equivalently the following model could be estimated: 
                               .                                                              (4)   
where    is a dummy variable for introduced for all but one of the donors, as well as an 
interaction term,   .       between each of these donor dummies and each of the 
explanatory variables. The omitted donor is the base category and the   coefficents in (4) 
will be equal to the estimated coefficients from equations (1)-(3) for that donor. If the 
coefficient    on the interaction term is significantly different from zero, this can be 
interpreted as evidence that donor i behaves significantly differently from the base donor 
in relation to the characteristic in question. This estimation strategy is suggested by 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) and their main innovation is that they allow for recipient 
specific effects    in equation (4): 
                               .                             (5)      
Model (5) is then estimated with a fixed effects estimator. However, there are two 
potential problems with their analysis. First, they do not include donor dummies which 
will bias the coefficients. Second, they only report the coefficients for one of the 
interaction terms and it is unclear whether all of the interaction terms were included. 
                                                            
6 For example, Roodman (2007) examines Burnside and Dollar (2000) and finds that “all the original OLS 
and 2SLS results rely on outliers for some or all of their significance.” 
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For our empirical analysis we use two different samples. First, we only us those recipient-
year observations that are common to all five top donors. This enables us to compare the 
coefficients across these donors and examine whether they allocate aid differently. We 
estimate model (4) using OLS and model (5) using a fixed effects estimator. Second, we 
then proceed to use the entire sample for all 22 DAC donors and estimate the difference 
between the top five donors and the “average” donor by including a donor dummy for each 
of the top five donors and an interaction term for each of the explanatory variables and the  
donor dummy.  
 Methodological Issues 
The nature of the data poses significant challenges in estimating the allocation of aid. Not 
all donors give aid to all countries, i.e. the aid variable is zero for a large number of cases 
and we thus face a potential sample selection problem. McGillivray (2002) discusses the 
estimation options and problems in detail. One option is to focus on actual recipients, 
where aid is positive. This therefore ignores the issue of selection by donors of aid 
recipients. Alternatively, non-recipients can be included in the sample. However, this 
results in the coefficients being biased if the zeros are a consequence of a non-random 
allocation process. A number of studies have applied the Tobit estimator in order to 
account for the censored nature of the data, though few find that there are significant 
differences from estimation using OLS (Alesina and Dollar (2000), McGillivray and White 
(1993), Thiele, Nunnenkamp and Dreher (2007), McGillivray (2002)).  
More recently Berthelemy (2006a, 2006b) and Fleck and Kilby (2007) have used two-
stage estimators to tackle this issue by estimating the selection decision first, followed by 
the allocation decision. Generally, the two-stage Heckman model relies on the ability to 
identify a variable that determines selection, but not allocation. In the foreign aid selection 
and allocation decision it is difficult to find a variable that explains the former but not the 
latter.  Thus, Berthelemy (2006a, 2006b) and Fleck and Kilby (2007) estimate the selection 
and allocation equations with an identical set of explanatory variables. However, the 
Heckman two-stage estimator does not perform well when the same explanatory variables 
are used in both the selection and allocation equations as identification then solely rests on 
the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio (Kennedy, 2003). In any case, those who have 
followed this procedure have found little correlation between the residuals in the allocation 
and selection equations. This indicates that the allocation equation is independent of the 9 
 
selection equation. Based on these results we chose to estimate the allocation equation 
without correcting for selection, since it does not seem to result in a significant bias.  
Explanatory Variables 
This leads us to the identification of the explanatory variables within our empirical model. 
Following the specification of previous studies our allocation model includes four 
categories of explanatory variables: recipient need, recipient merit, donor self-interest and 
controls. 
Recipient Need 
The need of the recipient is captured in this model by two variables: recipient income per 
capita and the amount of aid per capita received from other bilateral donors. Despite many 
potential explanatory variables that could capture recipient need (e.g. life expectancy or 
infant mortality), income per capita is the most straightforward to measure– if aid is 
allocated according to recipient need then there should be a negative relationship between 
aid and income per capita.  
Aid received from other donors captures either a substitution or complimentary effect 
between bilateral aid donors. Donors may chose to reduce aid to a recipient if other donors 
provide more aid, or display “herding” behaviour if we observe donors increasing aid to a 
country simultaneously. Although the presence of economies of scale could suggest that a 
positive relationship between donor’s aid disbursements is an efficient allocation, there is a 
history of aid “darlings and orphans” – with some countries attracting a high level of donor 
support and others getting very little.  
Recipient Merit 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggest that development aid is more effective when given to 
countries with good policies. Our “merit” variables analyse whether donors allocate more 
aid to recipients with better economic policies and more democratic regimes. 
We proxy economic policies by the growth of GDP per capita. We lag growth by one 
period to reduce the potential for the reverse causality of aid on growth, which Clemens et 
al (2004) show can be significant in the short-term. If donors consider good economic 
policies in their aid allocation we expect a positive relationship between aid and growth. 
However, as Feeny and McGillivray (2008) argue, donors could also interpret low growth 10 
 
as an indicator of high need. In this case the relationship between aid and growth would be 
negative. 
Other proxies of recipient merit are democracy and human rights. Democracy is measured 
using the Polity IV data set, which provides a rating between -10 and 10 to indicate the 
level of political openness, with higher values indicating more democratic regimes 
(Jaggers 1995). Human rights violations are measured using the Political Terror Scale, 
which is based on information by the US State Department and Amnesty International 
(Cornett, Gibney and Wood, 2006)
7. The index is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 
higher numbers indicating more human rights abuses.  The correlation coefficient between 
human rights and democracy is low (-0.15), suggesting that these variables estimate 
different aspects of political rights. As with the growth variable we lag both the democracy 
and human rights scores to reduce the possibility of feedback. 
Donor Self-Interest 
We included two measures of donor self interest: trade and voting allegiance in the United 
Nations (UN).  
The trade variable is included as an indicator of how donors’ commercial interests 
influence aid allocation, measured as the flow of import and exports between a donor and a 
recipient, as a percentage of donor GDP. There is the potential of reverse causality 
between trade and aid i.e. increased aid may cause increased trade rather than the other 
way around if aid is tied to the consumption of donor goods. To overcome this we lag the 
trade variable by one year.  
The “UN Friend” variable has been used as an indicator of donor self-interest, representing 
a geopolitical motivation for providing aid to recipient countries. Although there is a 
history of analysing UN voting allegiance and foreign aid in the political science literature 
(Dreher  at al (2006), Kegley and Hook (1991),  Rai (1980)), the importance of this 
variable gained prominence in Alesina and Dollar (2000). It is not possible to assume 
exogeneity of this variable: it is unclear whether aid rewards voting allegiance or vice 
versa, leading some to question it’s validity as an explanatory variable (Berthelemy 
2006b). However, as argued by Alesina and Dollar (2000) it can be interpreted as an 
                                                            
7 We use the State Department data in this paper, using the Amnesty International data did not change our 
results substantively.  11 
 
indicator of similar geopolitical interests despite not being able to infer a causal 
relationship.  
There are a number of issues when constructing the UN Friend variable (Dreher and 
Sturm, 2007). First, is the choice of how to deal with abstentions and absenteeism. Second, 
there is a great deal of variation in the importance of votes in the General Assembly and 
many votes are of little strategic importance to donor countries. However, given that there 
is no categorization of votes according to their importance and the subjective nature of 
what should be deemed “important”, all votes are included in our analysis. We use UN 
voting data constructed according to the method described by Kegley and Hook (1991). 
They calculate the number of times a recipient country votes alongside the donor countries 
(i.e. both voting yes or no) but discard abstentions and absenteeism, which are likely to be 
influenced by many factors other than geopolitical ties, particularly for developing 
countries. Our UN voting variable takes values between zero and one.  
Controls 
In addition to the above mentioned variables, we include controls for population and the 
total volume of aid each donor provides. As discussed by Berthelemy (2006b), these 
variables control for scale effects. 
The period over which the data spans also allows us to investigate how aid allocation 
changed both after the end of the Cold War (1990-2001) and more recently since the 
beginning of the “war on terror” after September 11
th 2001 (the final three years of the 
dataset). The end of the cold war coincided with a global economic downturn in the early 
1990s that saw a contraction of aid budgets. Conversely, the turn of the century has been a 
time of renewed commitment to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) through increased aid flows to poor countries. Therefore the coefficients on these 
dummy variables may be picking up more than the geopolitical changes.  
The descriptive statistics of all these variables for both samples (five top donors and all 22 




We begin our empirical analysis by examining the top five donors’ aid allocation, in line 
with Alesina and Dollar (2000). However, we restrict the sample to the observations that 
are common to all donors (1661 observations) and present our estimates our aid allocation 
model donor by donor in Table 3. This presentation makes it easy to compare the donors 
with each other. 
--- Table 3 about here --- 
The OLS results in Table 3 show that all of the major donors allocate more aid to poor 
countries. The coefficient on income per capita is the largest for the UK and the smallest 
for Germany. We also ran these regressions using all available observations per donor and 
we find that restricting our sample to only common observation has no significant impact 
on our results apart from the coefficient on income. This is probably due to the fact that a 
number of poor countries only receive aid from some of the donors in a particular year. 
Removing these countries from our sample, to ensure comparability of the donors’ 
coefficients, makes all donors appear less poverty focused. Although constricting the 
sample makes the donors’ coefficients directly comparable, we lose information about 
their true allocation behaviour – illustrating the major drawback to this approach. 
Our other proxy for recipient need, aid from other donors, is only significant for Germany. 
The positive coefficient indicates that Germany gives more aid to countries that already 
receive a lot of aid. This may indicate that Germany is not so much guided by recipient 
need but by other donors’ behaviour. Following Feeny and McGillivray (2008) we carried 
out tests for the joint significance of the recipient need variables, the results indicate that 
they are jointly significant for all countries. 
Recipient merit also appears important to the aid allocation decision of the donors. The UK 
is the only donor that rewards good economic policies as well as democracy, but does not 
reward countries with better human rights. France, Germany and Japan all take human 
rights abuses into account - higher values of the index indicate more human rights abuses, 
therefore the negative coefficient is evidence that donors reward better human rights. For 
the USA this coefficient is positive, countries with poorer human rights receive more aid. 
All donors bar France favour more democratic recipients. For all countries the merit 
variables were jointly significant (for France this was only true at the five percent level).  13 
 
Our results also show that donor self-interest is a motivation for foreign aid allocation. All 
donors provide more aid to trading partners and all donors except Germany give more aid 
to countries that regularly vote in line with them in the UN. Again, a test of joint 
significance indicates that our donor self-interest variables are significant for all countries.  
In accord with previous studies, we find some evidence of the so-called “small country 
bias”. Recipients with a smaller population receive more aid but this result only holds for 
the UK and Germany. The positive coefficient on the Cold War dummy confirms previous 
findings (Gupta et al 2006) that aid increased as a result of the end of the Cold war from 
the UK, France and Japan, ceteris paribus. However, we find a negative coefficient for 
both the USA and Germany. For the USA this may be a result of changing strategic 
motivations for foreign aid that existed during the Cold War era. Germany spent a lot of 
resources on German unification and international aid decreased during this time.
8 
It is likely that there will be unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among recipients that 
bias the OLS results if the unobservables are correlated with our explanatory variables. We 
attempt to control for time-invariant factors such as the special relations between certain 
donors and recipients (for example, the well known special relations between the USA, 
Israel and Egypt or Japan and Vietnam), colonial history (of particular importance to both 
the UK and France) and omitted recipient institutional quality variables by using a fixed 
effects estimator. Accounting for recipient-specific fixed effects changes a number of the 
coefficients on our explanatory variables (see Appendix Table A2). In particular, the trade 
and UN voting variables loose significance. This contradicts the findings of Alesina and 
Dollar (2000).  A joint test of the donor self-interest variable indicates that they are not 
jointly significant at the one percent level. For Germany the test indicates joint 
significance at the five percent level. These results suggest that the donor self-interest 
variables are in fact not as important as much of the previous literature indicates.  
So far the results from the ‘Alesina and Dollar’ model allowed us to compare the top five 
donors to each other. In Table 4 we contrast these results to a model that considers data 
from all of the 22 DAC donors. 
--- Table 4 about here --- 
                                                            
8 For the period 1990-2000 Burda and Hunt (2001) state that the transfers to Eastern Germany were in excess 
of DM 1.5 trillion. In 2000 these transfers were equivalent to about five percent of GDP.  14 
 
In column 1 we repeat the results from Table 3.  In this model Germany is the base 
category and all of the explanatory variables are interacted with a dummy for each of the 
other major donors. Since we constrain the sample to observations common to all top five 
donors the coefficients on the explanatory variables are the same as for the German aid 
allocation model in Table 3. Accounting for the interaction terms gives us the values for 
the UK, USA, France and Japan.  In the next column we use the full dataset on aid from all 
22 DAC donors. This enables us to compare the top five donors to the “average” donor’s 
allocation behaviour. Despite concerns that the donors’ samples are not directly 
comparable, we can not constrain this sample over only common observations because the 
newer, less wealthy donors (e.g. Greece) give a limited amount of aid in each year, and our 
sample would be too small to draw inference. Column 2 supports our previous results, like 
the top five donors the average donor allocates aid according to recipient need, recipient 
merit and self-interest. As a next step we allow for fixed recipient effects in this model 
(Column 3 of Table 5). The coefficient on the logarithm of per capita income, which 
denotes the elasticity of aid with respect to income, is not significantly different from -1. A 
one percentage increase in income results in a one percent average decrease in per capita 
aid i.e. donors view an extra dollar of aid and income as equivalent. The average recipient 
receives $2.92 in per capita aid from a donor, thus a unity elasticity of aid to income 
equates to an average decrease of roughly three US cents per capita per one percent 
increase in GDP, ceteris paribus. The UK is the only one of the top five donors who is 
significantly more responsive to poverty than the average donor. Conversely, Germany is 
found to be significantly less poverty-focused than the average donor.  
Growing economies receive more aid, on average aid increases by one percent for every 
one percent of growth – a difference of only three US cents per capita. The coefficients on 
the USA-growth and German-growth interaction terms are larger than -1, this means 
growing economies receive less aid. Recipients with better human rights and democracy 
receive more aid from the average donor. An improvement in democracy, whereby a 
country increases their Polity score by one point, results in a 0.8 percent increase in aid 
equivalent to about two US cents. The UK is the only major donor giving significantly 
more to democratic recipient countries, for a one point increase in the Polity score a 
recipient receives an additional 15 US cents. The effect of human rights is small. Although 
donors give more aid to countries with fewer human rights abuses, a decrease of one point 
in the index (which denotes fewer human rights abuses i.e. an improvement) results in 15 
 
around a four percent increase in aid per capita.  Japan gives significantly more than the 
average donor to countries with better human rights, a one point improvement results in an 
extra $1.08 in aid. 
The average donor allocates more aid to trading partners, the elasticity of aid with respect 
to trade is about 0.43. This equates to about one extra US cent in aid per one extra percent 
trade. This elasticity varies across the major five donors. For the UK and France the 
elasticity is unity, for Germany and Japan about 0.6 and for the USA only 0.3. Variables 
on UN voting indicate that the average donor gives more aid to recipients voting in line 
with France and less to those voting in line with the UK. The other UN voting variables 
are not statistically significant. The top five donors’ allocation behaviour is different with 
respect to UN voting. The USA, the UK and Japan give more aid to recipients voting in 
line with them while France and Germany provide less aid. The average recipient votes 16 
percent of the time with the USA, an increase to 17 percent is associated with a 8.7 percent 
increase in aid (25 US cents). 
The small country bias is also present in the aggregate data. A one percent increase in 
population is associated with an average 0.36 percent decrease in aid per capita, roughly 1 
US cent. This is below the elasticity of -1 previously estimated by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) and Berthelemy (2006a). 
Evaluation 
The final section of this paper moves beyond the analysis of previous studies by discussing 
the decomposition of the estimated relationship between aid allocation and the categories 
of explanatory variables. Using the estimated coefficients from our last regression 
(Column 3, Table 4) we first predict the average aid per capita and assess the relative 
importance of need, merit and donor self-interest at the mean of the variables. 
The donor specific factors are very important in our model, they account for about as much 
in the explanation of aid as all the other determinants put together. These dummies are 
likely to proxy for colonial history and the geopolitical ties that are not accounted for by 
either trade or UN voting patterns. We also experimented by including dummy variables 
for former colonies in our model and found that they had little impact on the significance 
of UN voting but that their inclusion did have an effect on the significance of the donor 16 
 
dummies
9. Thus, the donor dummies seem to partly capture historical ties. Although many 
studies have criticised the concentration of aid to former colonies, this may in fact be an 
efficient mechanism of partitioning the “market” for foreign aid between donors. 
Given this result, we hypothesise that donors allocate aid predominantly according to 
historical ties and then adjust aid in relation to the other criteria in the model. Using the 
estimates from Table 4, column 3 and predicting aid per capita for the average values of 
the explanatory variables, we analyse the relative importance of recipient need, merit and 
donor self-interest in the allocation of per capita aid. Table 5 shows the percentage of aid 
per capita that is determined by each of the allocation criteria other than those picked up 
by the donor dummy variables: 
--- Table 5 about here --- 
The largest proportion of predicted aid is explained by the control variables (44 percent), 
followed by recipient need (36 percent) and donor self-interest (16 percent). Recipient 
merit (two percent) and the recipient dummies (one percent) only play a marginal role in 
the allocation of aid.  
Based on our results donor self-interest is an important determinant of aid allocation, but 
its role has been overstated by previous studies such as that of Alesina and Dollar (2000). 
Furthermore, recipient merit only accounts for about two percent of the residual predicted 
per capita aid. Given that in the short to medium term merit is arguably the only factor that 
a developing country has the ability to change, our results indicate that donors are unlikely 
to allocate substantially more aid to countries with “good policy/governance”.  
We illustrate this by calculating how much more aid countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
would receive if they radically improved their record of democracy, human rights or 
economic policies compared to increasing linkages with the donor via increased trade. 
First, we use the average values for Sub-Saharan in order to predict aid per capita. A 
country with these characteristics would receive $2.81
10. We then vary one explanatory 
                                                            
9 Dummies for former colonies can only be included in the OLS estimation. In the fixed effect model these 
time-invariant recipient dummies would drop out, thus we follow Bertelemy (2006a) and interact the colony 
dummies with the donor dummies in order to be able to estimate the fixed effects model. To assess the 
difference between the donors would mean interacting these interaction terms making the model unwieldy 
and difficult to interpret. We thus excluded colonial ties from our model. 
10 The predicted level of aid per capita was obtained following Wooldridge (2005:219/20). Based on the 
model ln                                      and using the average values for Sub-Saharan countries we 17 
 
variable while holding all others constant. For example if this hypothetical country grew 
not at the average Sub-Saharan value of 0.54 percent, but tripled it to the average of non-
African recipients of 1.67 percent, donors would increase their aid by only four US cents 
to $2.85. Increasing the polity score from -2.95 to the non-African average of 2.33 would 
result in an increase of 13 cents to $2.94. The average of our human rights proxy is the 
same for recipients within and outside Sub-Saharan Africa and thus aid per capita remains 
unchanged. Africa’s international trade has been marginal, the average Sub-Saharan 
country only trades at 0.01 percent of the average donors’ GDP. If this were to increase to 
the average of other recipients it would have to rise to 0.11 percent. This tenfold increase 
would result in a massive increase in aid, this hypothetical country would then receive 
$6.74. Table 6 summarizes these policy experiments. 
--- Table 6 about here --- 
 
5. Conclusion 
Previous studies into aid allocation found that foreign aid is allocated not only according to 
the needs and merits of the recipient country but also according to the donors’ self-interest. 
We revisit this topic using a large, three-dimensional dataset covering the period 1980-
2004. By controlling for time-invariant donor and recipient effects, we analyse the 
differences in foreign aid allocation between the top five donors and how they differ from 
the average DAC donor. We go beyond the analysis of previous research by determining 
the relative importance of recipient need and merit relative to donor self-interest. Our 
results suggest that roughly half of the predicted value of aid is determined by donor 
specific effects, illustrating the fact that conventional aid allocation models are a relatively 
poor predictor of donor behaviour. Analysing the variation due to factors other than the 
donor effects we find that recipient need accounts for about 36 percent of the explained 
variation while donor self-interest accounts for about 16 percent. This suggests that 
previous literature has overplayed the importance of donor self-interest variables, such as 
trade and UN voting. Recipient merit accounts for only 2 percent of predicted aid per 
capita, indicating that the bilateral donors place little importance on recipient merit. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obtained a predicted value for each observation,             , and took the exponential  exp                         . 
We then regressed the level of aid on        ,                        and obtained the predicted level of aid by 
calculating                exp              . 18 
 
However, these are among the only factors that developing countries have the ability to 
change in the short to medium term. In terms of receiving increased aid, recipients have 
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Table 1: Top 10 Recipients of DAC Aid (Millions $US) 
Cold War 1980-1989  Post-Cold War 1990-2000  War on Terror 2001-2004 
Egypt  26,320 Egypt  46,117 Iraq  14,299 
India  25,349 Indonesia  26,898 Pakistan  7,717 
Indonesia  22,503 China  24,945 Indonesia  7,159 
Israel  20,743 India  18,963 China  6,936 
China  15,851 Israel  17,773 DRC  6,574 
Bangladesh  15,317 Philippines  16,158 India  5,944 
Pakistan  12,683 Thailand  13,010 Afghanistan  5,262 
Philippines  11,624 Bangladesh  10,352 Vietnam  4,123 
Tanzania  9,721 Vietnam  9,637 Russian  Fed.  4,006 
Turkey  9,454 Tanzania  9,156 Serbia&Mont.  3,518 
Source: OECD Online Statistics 
 
Table 2: Bilateral Aid from the Top Five Donors to Former Colonies (1980-2004)  
Donor  Aid to Former Colonies 
(%) 
Aid to Former Colonies  
(Million US$) 
UK 71%  36,798 
France 51%  67,748 
USA 3%  7,465 
Germany 3%  4,263 
Japan 0.0% 70 
Source: OECD Online Statistics 
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Table 3: How Do the Top Five Donors Allocate Aid? 
 UK  USA  Japan  Germany  France 
Recipient Need 
GDP  per  capita  (t-1)  -1.315 -0.510 -0.710 -0.447 -0.769 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Other Aid   -0.268  -0.396  0.045  1.531  0.350 
  (0.584)  (0.661)  (0.928)  (0.000)***  (0.433) 
 
Recipient Merit 
Growth  (t-1)  0.023 -0.006  0.015 0.001 0.007 
  (0.006)***  (0.469)  (0.116)  (0.895)  (0.394) 
Democracy  (t-1)  0.056 0.035 0.037 0.009 0.004 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.052)*  (0.545) 
Human  Rights  (t-1)  0.025 0.280 -0.280  -0.056  -0.122 
  (0.554)  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.041)**  (0.001)*** 
 
Donor Self Interest 
Trade  (t-1)  0.841 0.129 0.461 0.205 0.866 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UN Friend UK  3.505  -3.230  -1.948  -4.760  -4.062 
  (0.032)**  (0.046)**  (0.211)  (0.000)***  (0.002)*** 
UN Friend France  -1.688  -1.266  -1.382  2.697  2.676 
  (0.296)  (0.457)  (0.398)  (0.013)**  (0.065)* 
UN Friend USA  -4.424  7.112  -1.007  4.382  -1.048 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.218)  (0.000)***  (0.114) 
UN Friend Germany  -0.613  0.356  -0.603  -0.137  -0.047 
  (0.166)  (0.392)  (0.119)  (0.631)  (0.905) 
UN  Friend  Japan  0.571 1.680 4.746 1.184 1.656 
  (0.531)  (0.070)*  (0.000)***  (0.042)**  (0.049)** 
       
Controls           
Population  -1.325 -1.196 -0.475 1.035  -0.686 
  (0.007)***  (0.186)  (0.341)  (0.001)***  (0.126) 
Total aid  -0.015  1.272  0.772  0.972  1.255 
 (0.963)  (0.000)***  (0.011)** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Post-Cold  War  0.547  -0.781 0.308  -0.439 0.203 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.019)**  (0.000)***  (0.035)** 
War on Terror  0.172  -0.165  0.252  -0.680  -0.150 
  (0.452)  (0.438)  (0.207)  (0.000)***  (0.398) 
Constant  34.764 15.100 7.838  -33.160  6.322 
  (0.002)***  (0.447)  (0.516)  (0.000)***  (0.538) 
Observations  1661 1661 1661 1661 1661 
R-squared  0.418  0.316  0.209  0.337  0.484 
Note: Dependent variable = ln (aid per capita). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Robust p values in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Aid Allocation 
  (1) (2) (3) 






  OLS OLS FE 
Recipient Need       
GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.447  -0.816  -1.059 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Other Aid  1.531  1.182  0.810 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
     
Recipient Merit       
Growth (t-1)  0.001  0.013  0.010 
  (0.895)  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Polity (t-1)  0.009  0.027  0.008 
  (0.052)*  (0.000)***  (0.018)** 
Human Rights (t-1)  -0.056  0.058  -0.039 
  (0.041)**  (0.001)***  (0.030)** 
     
Donor Self-Interest       
Trade (t-1)  0.205  0.306  0.433 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UN Friend UK  -4.760  -4.959  -1.714 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.005)*** 
UN Friend USA  4.382  1.057  0.179 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.629) 
UN Friend France  2.697  4.240  1.857 
  (0.013)**  (0.000)***  (0.003)*** 
UN Friend Germany  -0.137  0.002  -0.019 
  (0.631)  (0.993)  (0.903) 
UN Friend Japan  1.184  0.698  -0.037 
  (0.042)**  (0.054)*  (0.920) 
     
Controls       
Population 1.035  0.303  -0.357 
  (0.001)***  (0.068)*  (0.093)* 
Total Aid  0.972  0.921  0.937 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Post  Cold  War  -0.439 -0.081 0.032 
  (0.000)***  (0.054)*  (0.473) 
War on Terror  -0.680  -0.239  -0.086 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.201) 
     
Donor Dummies       
UK  67.924 40.558 46.908 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
USA  48.259 22.898 1.288 
  (0.023)**  (0.256)  (0.943) 
France  39.482 22.400 28.643 
  (0.002)***  (0.026)**  (0.002)*** 
Germany   2.551  3.160 
    (0.088)*  (0.017)** 
Japan  40.998 21.646 25.725 
  (0.004)***  (0.053)*  (0.022)** 
     
Intercept       
  -33.160 -16.399 0.823 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.856) 
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Interaction Terms       
UK*GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.868  -0.590  -0.660 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
USA*GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.063  0.185  0.057 
  (0.417)  (0.007)***  (0.375) 
Germany*GDP per capita (t-1)    0.206  0.108 
    (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Japan*GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.263  -0.075  -0.023 
  (0.000)***  (0.108)  (0.609) 
France*GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.322  -0.069  -0.035 
  (0.000)***  (0.093)*  (0.339) 
UK*Population  -2.361 -1.206 -1.579 
  (0.000)***  (0.018)**  (0.001)*** 
USA*Population  -2.231 -1.063 -0.020 
  (0.020)**  (0.246)  (0.981) 
France*Population  -1.721 -0.851 -1.115 
  (0.002)***  (0.051)*  (0.007)*** 
Germany*Population  -0.000  -0.000 
    (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Japan*Population  -1.511 -0.620 -0.956 
  (0.011)**  (0.181)  (0.040)** 
UK*Growth (t-1)  0.022  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.025)**  (0.927)  (0.963) 
USA*Growth  (t-1)  -0.007 -0.023 -0.025 
  (0.499)  (0.003)***  (0.001)*** 
France*Growth (t-1)  0.006  -0.002  -0.005 
  (0.528)  (0.845)  (0.509) 
Germany*Growth (t-1)    -0.008  -0.013 
    (0.213)  (0.005)*** 
Japan*Growth (t-1)  0.014  0.015  0.006 
  (0.196)  (0.091)*  (0.476) 
UK*Total  Aid  -0.987 -0.896 -0.499 
  (0.007)***  (0.004)***  (0.079)* 
USA*Total Aid  0.300  0.285  -0.090 
  (0.380)  (0.327)  (0.732) 
France*Total Aid  0.282  -0.027  -0.086 
  (0.436)  (0.927)  (0.748) 
Germany*Total Aid    0.186  0.023 
    (0.272)  (0.879) 
Japan*Total  Aid  -0.200 -0.218 0.135 
  (0.567)  (0.421)  (0.610) 
UK*Other  Aid  -1.799 -0.986 -1.284 
  (0.002)***  (0.052)*  (0.005)*** 
USA*Other  Aid  -1.927 -1.178 -0.067 
  (0.044)**  (0.198)  (0.935) 
France*Other  Aid  -1.181 -0.643 -0.787 
  (0.031)**  (0.138)  (0.054)* 
Germany*Other Aid    -0.545  -0.259 
    (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Japan*Other  Aid  -1.487 -0.925 -1.178 
  (0.011)**  (0.045)**  (0.011)** 
UK*Trade (t-1)  0.636  0.508  0.593 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
USA*Trade  (t-1)  -0.076 -0.123 -0.100 
  (0.098)*  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
France*Trade (t-1)  0.661  0.500  0.623 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Germany*Trade (t-1)    -0.087  0.139 
    (0.003)***  (0.000)*** 
Japan*Trade (t-1)  0.256  0.163  0.187 27 
 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UK*Polity (t-1)  0.047  0.045  0.043 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
USA*Polity (t-1)  0.026  0.009  0.003 
  (0.004)***  (0.261)  (0.720) 
France*Polity  (t-1)  -0.005 -0.012 -0.011 
  (0.575)  (0.051)*  (0.054)* 
Germany*Polity (t-1)    0.005  -0.003 
    (0.365)  (0.566) 
Japan*Polity (t-1)  0.028  0.020  0.008 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.186) 
UK*Human Rights (t-1)  0.081  -0.058  -0.043 
  (0.107)  (0.185)  (0.281) 
USA*Human Rights (t-1)  0.336  0.159  0.111 
  (0.000)***  (0.002)***  (0.020)** 
France*Human  Rights  (t-1) -0.066 -0.114 -0.080 
  (0.154)  (0.002)***  (0.025)** 
Germany*Human Rights (t-1)    -0.146  -0.132 
    (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Japan*Human  Rights  (t-1)  -0.224 -0.351 -0.333 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UK*UN Friend UK  8.265  7.602  7.124 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UK*UN  Friend  USA  -8.806 -4.126 -4.009 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
UK*UN  Friend  Germany  -0.476 -0.819 -1.038 
  (0.366)  (0.076)*  (0.013)** 
UK*UN Friend Japan  -0.613  0.302  0.148 
  (0.571)  (0.747)  (0.860) 
UK*UN Friend France  -4.385  -5.360  -4.859 
  (0.024)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
USA*UN Friend USA  2.731  7.844  8.500 
  (0.025)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
USA*UN Friend UK  1.530  1.535  1.534 
  (0.422)  (0.361)  (0.309) 
USA*UN Friend Germany  0.493  0.455  0.518 
  (0.328)  (0.312)  (0.206) 
USA*UN Friend France  -3.963  -5.645  -4.950 
  (0.050)**  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
USA*UN Friend Japan  0.496  0.671  0.096 
  (0.650)  (0.482)  (0.912) 
France*UN Friend France  -0.021  -2.839  -3.274 
  (0.991)  (0.046)**  (0.011)** 
France*UN Friend Germany  0.090  -0.036  -0.206 
  (0.855)  (0.924)  (0.543) 
France*UN Friend UK  0.698  2.642  3.120 
  (0.673)  (0.043)**  (0.008)*** 
France*UN Friend Japan  0.472  0.515  0.651 
  (0.644)  (0.534)  (0.387) 
France*UN Friend USA  -5.430  -1.872  -2.647 
  (0.000)***  (0.003)***  (0.000)*** 
Germany*UN Friend Germany    -0.345  -0.644 
    (0.309)  (0.031)** 
Germany*UN Friend UK    0.967  1.230 
    (0.396)  (0.217) 
Germany*UN Friend Japan    0.091  1.098 
    (0.891)  (0.062)* 
Germany*UN Friend USA    3.586  2.691 
    (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Germany*UN Friend France    -1.757  -2.894 28 
 
    (0.161)  (0.008)*** 
Japan*UN Friend Japan  3.562  3.289  2.723 
  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
Japan*UN Friend Germany  -0.466  -0.660  -0.566 
  (0.332)  (0.109)  (0.159) 
Japan*UN Friend France  -4.078  -4.207  -3.815 
  (0.038)**  (0.009)***  (0.013)** 
Japan*UN Friend UK  2.812  2.833  3.368 
  (0.129)  (0.066)*  (0.022)** 
Japan*UN Friend USA  -5.388  -2.269  -2.587 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
UK*Post Cold War  0.986  0.461  0.639 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
USA* Post Cold War  -0.342  -0.771  -0.795 
  (0.020)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
France* Post Cold War  0.642  0.139  0.286 
  (0.000)***  (0.140)  (0.001)*** 
Germany*Post Cold War    -0.388  -0.101 
    (0.000)***  (0.145) 
Japan* Post Cold War  0.748  0.360  0.397 
  (0.000)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)*** 
UK*War on Terror  0.853  0.334  0.383 
  (0.002)***  (0.148)  (0.075)* 
USA*War on Terror  0.515  -0.183  -0.096 
  (0.046)**  (0.440)  (0.657) 
France*War on Terror  0.531  0.098  0.163 
  (0.020)**  (0.557)  (0.302) 
Germany*War on Terror    -0.412  -0.264 
    (0.006)***  (0.054)* 
Japan*War on Terror  0.932  0.427  0.590 
  (0.000)***  (0.031)**  (0.002)*** 
Observations 8305  27373  27373 
R-squared  0.443  0.518  0.601 
Notes: Dependent variable = ln (aid per capita). Germany is the base donor in model (1). * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust p values in parentheses.  29 
 
Table 5: Proportions of predicted aid attributed to each category of allocation  
Category Predicted  Aid 
Controls 44% 
Need 36% 
Donor Self-Interest  16% 
Merit 2% 
Recipient Dummies  1% 
 
Table 6: Predicted aid per capita to Sub-Saharan Africa  
Predicted aid per capita  $2.81 
Improved growth  $2.85 
Improved democracy  $2.94 
Improved human rights  $2.81 



























Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Sample 1: Top Five Donors (8,305 observations) Sample 2: 22 DAC Donors (27,373 observations) 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
ln Aid per capita  0.229 1.960  -8.320 6.110  -1.431  2.619  -11.653 6.566 
Aid per capita  5.882  18.076  0.0002  450.300  2.921  14.075  8.70E-06  710.345 
ln GDP per capita (t-1)  6.668 1.127  4.468  9.960  6.754 1.184  4.468  10.748 
ln Other Aid  8.318  1.508  3.410  12.016  8.251  1.570  3.410  12.114 
Growth (t-1)  1.242 5.172  -30.025  25.743 1.248 5.918  -43.949 100.831 
Polity (t-1)  0.210  6.983  -10  10  0.350  6.903  -10  10 
Human Rights (t-1)  2.675 1.017  1  5  2.714 1.038  1  5 
ln Trade (t-1)  -4.667  2.019  -12.465  0.9151  -4.472  2.241  -16.967  1.531 
UN Friend UK  0.375 0.134  0  0.758  0.3816  0.134  0  0.758 
UN Friend USA  0.163  0.086  0  0.734  0.163  0.087  0  0.734 
UN Friend France  0.400 0.120  0  0.742  0.405 0.120  0  0.742 
UN Friend Germany  0.456  0.155  0  0.841  0.462  0.155  0  0.854 
UN Friend Japan  0.488 0.126  0  0.761  0.493 0.127  0  0.761 
ln Population  16.155  1.504  12.732  20.970  16.224  1.569  12.376  20.97 
ln Total Aid  8.607 0.634  7.117  10.077 7.180 1.428  2.802  10.077 
Post Cold War  0.547  0.498  0  1  0.555  0.497  0  1 
War on Terror  0.057 0.232  0  1  0.068 0.252  0  1 32 
 
Table A2: Aid Allocation - Fixed Effects Results  
 UK  USA  Japan  Germany  France 
Recipient Need 
GDP per capita (t-1)  -0.758 -1.472 -0.091 -0.441 -0.424 
  (0.018)**  (0.000)***  (0.702)  (0.031)**  (0.059)* 
Other Aid   0.058 -0.559  0.427 0.659 0.245 
  (0.877)  (0.273)  (0.267)  (0.005)***  (0.436) 
Recipient Merit 
Growth (t-1)  0.016 0.008 0.022 0.007 0.020 
  (0.006)***  (0.164)  (0.003)***  (0.058)*  (0.000)*** 
Democracy (t-1)  0.023 0.019 0.007 0.011 0.007 
  (0.001)***  (0.031)**  (0.385)  (0.049)**  (0.366) 
Human Rights (t-1)  -0.003 -0.011 -0.328 -0.167 -0.113 
  (0.945)  (0.781)  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
    
Donor Self-Interest 
Trade (t-1)  0.074 0.032 0.002 0.123 0.091 
  (0.358)  (0.587)  (0.978)  (0.034)**  (0.146) 
UN Friend UK  2.440  -2.505 -1.695 -1.478 -0.878 
  (0.033)**  (0.050)**  (0.223)  (0.072)*  (0.397) 
UN Friend France  -3.005  1.584 0.900 0.812 0.425 
  (0.006)***  (0.200)  (0.519)  (0.309)  (0.679) 
UN Friend USA  0.992 -1.341  0.173 0.280 -1.045 
  (0.210)  (0.100)*  (0.854)  (0.607)  (0.114) 
UN Friend Germany  -0.604 0.100  -0.100 -0.339 0.384 
  (0.034)**  (0.705)  (0.745)  (0.108)  (0.124) 
UN Friend Japan  0.368 1.714 1.264 1.078 0.975 
  (0.538)  (0.007)***  (0.088)*  (0.010)**  (0.092)* 
    
Controls 
Population  -1.162 -1.819 0.452  -0.937 -1.091 
  (0.049)**  (0.005)***  (0.475)  (0.011)**  (0.019)** 
Total aid   0.447 0.912 0.533 0.840 0.755 
  (0.042)**  (0.000)***  (0.022)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Post-Cold War  0.258 -0.161  0.003 0.004 -0.034 
  (0.013)**  (0.122)  (0.981)  (0.954)  (0.664) 
War on Terror  0.057 0.173 -0.033  -0.290  -0.027 
  (0.734)  (0.294)  (0.843)  (0.009)***  (0.830) 
Constant  19.275 36.218 -14.145  7.043  12.411 
  (0.101)  (0.005)***  (0.251)  (0.348)  (0.202) 
Observations  1661 1661 1661 1661 1661 
No of recipients  117  117  117  117  117 
R-squared  0.040 0.162 0.059 0.253 0.097 
Rho  0.80  0.83  0.66  0.92  0.83 
Notes: Dependent variable = ln (aid per capita) *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Standard errors calculated with White’s correction for heteroskedasticity. Robust p values in 
parentheses. 
 